abstracts (2007)

2007 October 19th at 5pm
Categorizing Causal Influences
Peter Gildenhuys

In this WIP talk, I will discuss how to categorize causal influences on populations over which selection theory is being deployed in a manner that promises to show how causal descriptions can be linked with mathematical models.

2007 October 5th at 5pm
Peter Distelzweig

In a number of places in the corpus Aristotle discusses the already developed disciplines that have come to be called the mixed or middle sciences: astronomy, harmonics, optics and mechanics. In Physics II.2 Aristotle calls them "the more natural branches of mathematics". They are mathematical disciplines which treat, however, a particular domain of the natural world. In this they differ from universal mathematics, and even geometry and arithmetic, which are not so connected to a particular natural domain. Aristotle finds these mathematical sciences of particular interest for a number of reasons. Their character, thinks Aristotle, provides strong evidence for his account of the nature of mathematics, particularly in contrast to that of the Platonist. These sciences are also of interest to Aristotle because they straddle natural and mathematical science. As such, the natural mathematical sciences allow for exceptions to certain restrictions on demonstrative science and introduce a disciplinary divide between knowledge of the facts and phenomena exhibited in their natural domain on the one hand, and on the other hand, the proper demonstrative knowledge of the causes or reason why the various facts hold. His treatment of these sciences reflects Aristotle's understanding of an important topic in the history of natural science—the relationship between mathematics and scientific knowledge of the natural world. However, the rather fragmentary character of his discussion of these issues has made it difficult for historians to piece together his view. In this paper I provide an account of Aristotle's understanding of these sciences: what the proper subjects of the mixed sciences are, what attributes they consider, and the nature of their demonstrations. This will require a brief examination of Aristotle's account of mathematics and the structure of demonstrative science. With these in place we can understand Aristotle's account of the structure of the mixed sciences and their relationship to mathematics and natural science. I will conclude with a brief comment on the merits and applicability of such an account to the "New Science" of the 17th century.

2007 September 20th at 5pm
Alan Turing and the Machine-Based View of the Mind
Christian Beenfeldt

In this paper foundational issues in Alan Turing's philosophy of mind are discussed. It is argued that his view must be understood as flowing from a certain proto-functionalist position. Central to this position is a doctrine I term Turing Mechanism. In brief, this doctrine states (1) that the human brain can be fully understood as a discrete state machine capable of being imitated by a universal machine, (2) that there exists an identity relationship of brain function to mentality, and (3) that digital computers in principle will be able to think by virtue of their ability to predict and mimic the discrete state functions of the human brain. It will be shown how an explicit identification of this doctrine increases our understanding of the famous, but often misunderstood, Turing Test. Finally, it is argued that Turing mechanism and Putnam's subsequent machine functionalism are two substantially similar views--and that Turing, rather than Putnam, well could be regarded as the father of (machine) functionalism in recent intellectual history.

2007 April 27th at 5pm
On the Alleged Impossibility of Bayesian Coherentism
Jonah Schupbach

Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann present an "impossibility result" against Bayesian Coherentism. This result putatively shows that coherence is separable if and only if it cannot be given a probabilistic, complete and transitive ordering relation. Bovens and Hartmann intend their result to apply to any such ordering, and thus to any proposed order-inducing probabilistic measure of coherence. Underlying their notion of separability - and thus underlying their impossibility result - is Bovens and Hartmann's introduction and support of a set of specific ceteris paribus conditions. In this paper, I argue that these ceteris paribus conditions are not clearly appropriate. Certain proposed coherence measures not only motivate different such conditions but they also call for the rejection of at least one of Bovens and Hartmann's conditions. I show that there exist sets of ceteris paribus conditions which, at least prima facie, have the same intuitive advantages as Bovens and Hartmann's conditions but which also allow one to sidestep the impossibility result altogether. This shifts the debate from the merits of the impossibility result itself to the underlying choice of ceteris paribus conditions.

2007 April 13th at 5pm
The NCC and the Individuation of Qualia
Justin Sytsma

This talk is part of a larger project that investigates what is meant by various calls for a "science of consciousness." I distinguish two types by their focus on phenomenal consciousness – the "old" science and the "new" science. One common feature of the new science is a focus on finding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) as a first step to explaining phenomenal consciousness. I argue, here, that this project is conceptually incoherent. What has attracted people to the project is the hope of finding a scientific answer to the supposed mystery of phenomenal consciousness. Understood in terms of phenomenal consciousness, however, the correlation relation demands that consciousness be thought of as private. If it is instead taken to be public, then we are identifying phenomenal consciousness with something about the brain; but, this is not to give a correlation. Taking phenomenal consciousness to be private, leaves us the task of justifying our descriptions of it, our demarcation of it into types or parts. This justification could only be private (for the justification to be public would be to make phenomenal consciousness public). That is, phenomenal consciousness must carry its justifications with it; its divisions must be self-individuating. Expanding on Wittgenstein's so called "private language argument" (PLA), I argue that no such private justification can be had. If this is correct, then the NCC project, as typically understood, is an empirical red-herring.

2007 March 16th at 5pm
Sketch of a Theory of Emergence
Sam Thomsen

Traditionally, emergence has been employed to militate against the unity of science. With this fundamental purpose in mind, I have been considering the possibility of an epistemological, complexity based definition of emergence. My proposed definition, to put it roughly, is that an emergent domain is one that is both capable of universal computation and efficiently simulating the knower (or more precisely, the "prediction machine") in question. The power of this formulation, I suggest, is that it gives the emergent domain the capability of "diagonalizing" and hence frustrating the prediction the machine. I have been working on a series of theorems to show that this would give us the three things we most want from emergent domains: (1) the possibility of endless new special sciences concerning such domains, (2) the non-derivability of these sciences from lower-level sciences, and (3) a need to posit new, higher-level entities. At this point I have some candidate proofs of these theorems roughly worked out, and I'm currently working on a precise foundation for my theory of prediction machines. The first part of my talk will be geared toward the less mathematically inclined who are interested in emergence. The second part will concern some of the basic mathematical ideas I'm trying to develop, and some toy examples of domains and predictors.

2007 March 2nd at 4pm
Keith Bemer

In his 1989 article "Extragalatic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing," Ian Hacking defends what he describes as a "modest astrophysical antirealism" based in part on arguments presented in his 1982 "Representing ans Intervening." Since astronomical entities – stars, quasars, nebulae, etc. – presently and, quite likely, permanently elude our abilities to put them to use in an experimental setting, it seems that Hacking's brand of "experimental realism" cannot apply to astronomical phenomena/entities. By way of a detailed examination of the phenomenon of gravitational lensing, he concludes that astronomy (astrophysics, cosmology, etc.) is not a natural science on par with e.g. particle physics, biology, etc. Despite the major advances in observational technology, Hacking claims that "the method of the science is the same as that of astronomy in Hellenistic times," and that, due to its inability to interfere and manipulate its objects in order to understand them, the aim of astronomy is merely "to save the phenomena" – an aim which he considers (pace van Fraassen) to be "an entirely subsidiary aspect of scientific activity."

In a 1993 article entitled "Astronomy and Antirealism," Dudley Shapere takes Hacking to task, arguing that astronomy is a science on par with the others and that Hacking "has misconceived the meaning and role of experiment in science, and thus the scientific enterprise and its history generally" (bold claim!).

What is the status of astronomy compared with the other, more (literally) mundane, sciences? Does the fact that we cannot experiment on (with?) astronomical entities compromise the epistemic status of scientific claims in astronomy? Or, alternatively, is there a sense in which we can perform astronomical experiments? How important of a distinction is there between observation and experiment? And what of Hackings claim that the aim of science does not "aim" at "saving the phenomena?" Does our modern notion of science fundamentally include some sense of manipulation and/or interference through contrived experience, which astronomy lacks?

2007 February 16th at 4pm
Liz Irvine

Block's distinction between Access and Phenomenal consciousness, (see 1995, 2001, 2005), states that there is at least a conceptual distinction between the what-it-is-likeness of an experience (P consciousness), and its information processing counterpart (A consciousness). Snodgrass and Block claim that Snodgrass's Signal Detection Theory approach to perception provides a method of operationalising P consciousness, and an example of P without A consciousness in the exclusion-failure paradigm. It will be argued on several grounds that the claim by Snodgrass and Block is flawed and is yet another example of cross-talk and confusion on the meaning of terms. First, the inference from the fact that motivation enables subjects to use previously ignored perceptual information to the claim that these previously ignored perceptions were P but not A conscious, is unjustified. An equally good explanation is that motivation enables the use of previously completely unconscious perceptions, thus making them both A and P conscious. Second and more importantly, it will be argued that the characterisation of 'weakly conscious' percepts in Snodgrass's model implies that 'weakly conscious' percepts refer to low-grade percepts that exhibit qualities of both A and P consciousness, rather than being purely P conscious percepts. Signal detection theory (SDT) is essentially concerned with graded conscious experience; to interpret low-grade perception as P but not A conscious is to remove the functional properties of low grade perception and is antithetical to the core of SDT. In conclusion, Snodgrass's SDT model as applied to exclusion-failure paradigms does not illustrate an example of P without A consciousness, and in fact supports instead the existence of graded levels of consciousness that are both A and P conscious 'all the way down'.

2007 February 9th at 5pm
Interpreting Microscopic Evidence in 19th c. Neuroanatomy
Catherine Stinson

Cellular theory came late to neuroscience. Cajal is largely credited with finally establishing that nerve cells are the main anatomical units in the brain through his taming of the unruly Golgi staining method. This result fell hard on the ears of Golgi, who had been, and remained, a steadfast supporter of the opponent reticular theory. It remains mysterious why Golgi stuck firm to reticular theory long after every other major figure in the field had accepted the so-called "neuron doctrine," and the evidence for it was overwhelmingly taken to be convincing. Also mysterious is how Golgi could have repeatedly stated in print and elsewhere that he accepted the claim that was the neuron doctrine's defining feature, while still claiming, sometimes almost in the same breath, that the neuron doctrine was wrong, and furthermore how his detractors could have failed to notice that he in fact seemed to accept the claim that they insisted upon. The only plausible explanation that has been offered is that Golgi was talking about function, while Cajal was talking about anatomy, and so they did not so much disagree about the phenomena as about the terminology or the interpretation. What I plan to explore is another (compatible) explanation, which is that they were "seeing" differently, seeing something different, or interpreting what they saw differently, and I want to figure out why and how this happened. I will discuss my plan to recreate some of their original experiments, and some possible angles from which I might approach the project. What I'd like to hear from you are suggestions of what I should read as historical and philosophical background, and views on which approaches seem most likely to produce a passing comp paper.

2007 February 2nd at 5:30pm
What Structure Is Not
Bryan W. Roberts

What is the relationship between world and physical theory? Worrall's "structural realist" answer to this question has taken some new twist in recent years, perhaps most conspicuously with the development of a more refined notion of "structure". This talk begins with a brief primer on post Worrall structural realism and its motivation, followed by a discussion of the group-theoretically inspired structures being proposed. I then present what may be a serious limitation for these structures within the structural realist account, which stems from a special kind of permutation on their elements. I end with a discussion of the conclusions that may be drawn from this result.